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Dirty Windshield Leads to $255K Pedestrian Injury Verdict

Dirty Windshield Leads to $255K Pedestrian Injury Verdict

By Sohini Chakraborty
6 min read
Dirty Windshield Leads to $255K Pedestrian Injury Verdict

Case Background

Dennis Land Yee filed a negligence lawsuit against Barbara Guido in the Superior Court of California, County of Contra Costa, Unlimited Jurisdiction, on July 9, 2024. The case was assigned case number C24-01796 and was assigned to Department 18, before Judge Danielle K. Douglas, for all purposes. Yee was represented by Shahrad Milanfar of Milanfar Law Firm, PC, in Walnut Creek, California. The lawsuit named Guido and Doe Defendants 1 through 20 as Defendants and sought damages arising from a pedestrian-vehicle collision that occurred in Orinda, California.

Cause

On October 8, 2023, Yee was walking his dog, Harry, along the eastbound lane of Overhill Road in Orinda at around 9:30 a.m. While he was on foot, Guido drove her Cadillac Eldorado eastbound on the same road. Her windshield was significantly dirty, which obscured her view of the road ahead. As a result, her car struck Yee and Harry.

Emergency services responded to the scene, and the Orinda Police Department found Yee lying on the asphalt facing the eastbound lane of Overhill Road. Paramedics transported him by ambulance to John Muir Hospital. Police investigated the collision and determined that Guido was at fault because she violated California Vehicle Code Section 26708, which prohibits driving with anything on the windshield that obstructs the driver's view. Investigators found that her windshield was dirty enough to prevent her from clearly seeing the roadway or anything in front of her car.

Yee's complaint also alleged that Guido violated Vehicle Code Section 21954, which requires drivers to exercise due care for the safety of pedestrians even when those pedestrians are not in a marked or unmarked crosswalk. Additionally, the complaint alleged that Guido violated Vehicle Code Section 22350 by driving at approximately 15 miles per hour despite having extremely limited visibility, which the complaint described as an unsafe speed given the conditions she herself created by not cleaning her windshield. Based on these alleged violations, Yee's complaint argued that Guido's conduct amounted to negligence per se under California Evidence Code Section 669.

Injury

According to the complaint, Yee suffered injuries from the collision and experienced past and future pain, mental suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, physical impairment, inconvenience, grief, anxiety, and emotional distress. The complaint also stated that Harry became permanently injured as a result of the crash.

Damages Sought

Yee's complaint requested general damages, special damages, compensatory damages, any statutory damages allowed by law, and costs of suit, with the exact amounts to be determined according to proof at trial.

Key Arguments and Proceedings

Plaintiff: Dennis Land Yee

·       Counsel for Plaintiff: Shahrad Milanfar

Defendant: Barbara Guido

·       Counsel for Defendant: Deborah T. Bjonerud | Steven C Toschi

Claims

Yee's complaint brought a single cause of action for negligence against Guido and the unnamed Doe Defendants. The complaint stated that jurisdiction was proper because the alleged damages exceeded $35,000, and that venue was proper because the events giving rise to the lawsuit occurred substantially in Orinda, within Contra Costa County.

The complaint argued that Guido owed Yee, and the general public, a duty to operate her vehicle safely and in compliance with applicable traffic laws. It further argued that Guido breached this duty by failing to drive at a safe speed, failing to exercise due care for pedestrian safety, and failing to keep her windshield clean enough to see the road clearly. The complaint stated that Guido knew or should have known that driving in such a dangerous condition was likely to cause a collision and injury to other road users.

Yee's complaint relied heavily on the theory of negligence per se, arguing that because Guido violated specific vehicle code sections designed to protect pedestrians like Yee from exactly the type of collision that occurred, her negligence should be presumed under Evidence Code Section 669. The complaint asserted that Guido's violations of the vehicle code were the direct and proximate cause of Yee's injuries and damages, which it broke down into mental, physical, and nervous pain and suffering, physical impairment, emotional distress, inconvenience, and medical expenses.

The complaint also noted that Yee did not know the true identities of the Doe Defendants at the time of filing and reserved the right to amend the complaint once those identities became known.

Defense

Guido filed her answer on September 13, 2024, through her attorney Deborah T. Bjonerud. In her answer, Guido denied every allegation in the complaint that referred to her, and she denied that Yee had been damaged in the amounts alleged or in any other amount.

Guido raised four affirmative defenses. First, she argued comparative negligence, stating that if Yee suffered any loss or injury, that loss or injury was caused or contributed to by Yee's own failure to act as a reasonably prudent person would under the circumstances, and that any recovery should be barred, diminished, or reduced to the extent his injuries were attributable to his own negligence.

Second, Guido argued that the complaint failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against her.

Third, Guido raised an apportionment defense, arguing that if Yee suffered any damages, those damages were caused or contributed to by persons other than herself, including but not limited to the Doe Defendants, and that liability among all Defendants, named or unnamed, should be apportioned according to their relative degrees of fault.

Fourth, Guido argued that Yee failed to mitigate his damages, and that any recovery should be reduced or diminished accordingly.

Based on these defenses, Guido asked the Court to rule that Yee take nothing from his complaint, to award her costs of suit, and to grant any other relief the Court deemed just and proper. Along with her answer, Guido demanded a jury trial.

Jury Verdict

The case proceeded to a jury trial that began on December 2, 2025, in Department 18 of the Contra Costa County Superior Court, before Judge Danielle K. Douglas. The jury reached its verdict and signed the special verdict form on December 17, 2025, with Jeffrey Friedman serving as the presiding juror.

On the first question, the jury found that Guido had been negligent. On the second question, the jury found that Guido's negligence was a substantial factor in causing harm to Yee.

Moving to damages, the jury determined Yee's total damages as follows. For past paid medical expenses, the parties had stipulated to an amount of $12,335.79. The jury awarded $175,000 for past non-economic loss as defined in CACI 3905A. For future medical expenses, the jury awarded $30,000. For future non-economic loss as defined in CACI 3905A, the jury awarded $30,000. For future expenses related to Harry, the jury awarded $2,200.

On the question of whether Yee himself had been negligent, the jury found that he had not. Because the jury found Yee was not negligent, it did not need to address whether his conduct was a substantial factor in causing his own harm, and the verdict form left that question and the related percentage-of-responsibility question blank.

In total, between the stipulated past medical expenses and the amounts the jury awarded for past and future non-economic loss, future medical expenses, and future expenses for Harry, the jury's findings reflected total damages of $249,535.79 in favor of Yee.

Court Documents

Complaint

Jury Verdict

About the Author

SC

Sohini Chakraborty

Sohini Chakraborty is a lawyer, with over two years of experience in legal research and analysis. She specializes in working closely with expert witnesses, offering critical support in preparing legal research and detailed case studies.